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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
]1

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintifl/Appellee,
vs.

Court of Appeals #: 960723-CA

]
]
]>

STEVEN STEFANIAK,
Defendant/Appellant.

Priority #: 29(b)(2)

]

III. JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 78-2a-3(2)(e),
1953 As Amended.
IV. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1«

Impartial Unbiased Tury Panel. Was the Defendant's right to a trial by an

impartial jury violated?
a.

Did the trial court improperly deny the Defendant's "for cause" challenge

of Juror Dan Ames and/or fail to adequately probe his potential bias?
i.

Standard of Review. A Motion to Dismiss a prospective juror for

cause is within the sound discretion of the trial court. When reviewing
such a ruling, the Court will reverse only if the trial court has abused its
discretion.
ii.

Supporting Authorities. State vs. Woollev. 810 P.2d 440 (Utah

Ct. App. 1991); State vs. GotschalL 782 P.2d 459 (Utah 1989); State vs.
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Dixon. 560 P.2d 318 (Utah 1977); Jenkins vs. Parrish. 627 P.2d 533 (Utah
1981); State vs. Mian. 771 P.2d 1061 (Utah 1989); State vs. Bishop. 75 3
P.2d 439 (Utah 1988); State vs. Brooks. 631 P.2d 878 (Utah 1981)
("Brooks II"); State vs Brooks. 563 P.2d 799 (Utah 1977) ("Brooks

D;

State vs. Cobb. 774 P.2d 1123 (Utah 1989).
b.

Did the trial Court adequately probe the potential bias of Jurois

Kimberly

Wilson,

employed

by

the

Rich

County

Assessor's

Office;

Lennis Hellstrom, sister-in-law was secretary at Rich County Sheriffs Office;
Julie Whatcott, niece of the court and county clerk; and Perry Norris, who ha I
encountered a couple of similar situations, including a relative, tlirough his
position as bishop?

c.

i.

Standard of Review. See 1. a. i. above.

ii.

Supporting Authority. See 1. a. ii. above.

Was defense counsel's failure to determine the nature of the Juror,

Dan Ames, prior knowledge of the case and/or to renew his motion to dismiss
Juror Ames for cause, ineffective assistance of counsel?
i.

Standard of Review.

The claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel is a mixed question of law and fact and the reviewing court may
review the facts. There must be a showing that trial counsel's performance
was deficient and Defendant was prejudiced by the deficient performance.
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ii.

Supporting Authorities. State vs. Johnson. 823 P.2d 484 (Utah Ct.

App. 1991); State vs. Vigil 840 P.2d 788 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); State vs.
Templin. 805 P.2d 182 (Utah 1990).
2.

Sufficiency of Evidence. Was the reliable evidence sufficient to support each

element of the offense to the standard of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt?
a.

S t a n d a i i l ol Review.

This Court must review the evidence and all

inferences which may reasonably be drawn from it in the light most favorable to
the verdict of the jury.

The conviction may be reversed, for insufficiency of

evidence, only when the evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or
inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable
doubt that the Defendant committed the crime.
b.

Supporting Authority. State vs. Singer. 815 P.2d 1303 (Utah Ct. App.

1991); State vs. Petree. 659 P.2d 443 (Utah 1983); State vs. Vigil, supra; State vs.
Nmbold. 581 P.2d991 (Utah 1972): State vs. Walker. 743 P.2d 191 (Utah 1987).

V. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES & RULES
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution:
[Rights of the accused.]
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained
by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defense.
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The Constitution of Utah, Article I, Section 12:
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be
confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel
the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an
impartial jury of the county or district in wliich the offense is alleged to have been
committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any accused
person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure
the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to give evidence
against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor
a husband against his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the
same offense.
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination,
the function of that examination is limited to determining whether probable cause
exists unless otherwise provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall
preclude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute or rule in whole
or in part at any preliminary examination to determine probable cause or at any
pretrial proceeding with respect to release of the defendant if appropriate
discovery is allowed as defined by statute or rule.
Utah Code Annotated 76-9-702.5, Lewdness Involving Child.
(1) A person is guilty of lewdness involving a child if the person under
circumstances not amounting to rape of a child, object rape of a child, sodomy
upon a child, sexual abuse of a child, or an attempt to commit any of these
offenses, performs an act of sexual intercourse or sodomy, exposes his or her
genitals or private parts, masturbates, engages in trespassory voyeurism, or
performs any other act of gross lewdness, under circumstances which he or she
should know will likely cause affront or alarm, to, on, or in the presence of
another who is under 14 years of age.
(2) Lewdness involving a child is a class A misdemeanor.
Note: Statute was substantially changed after 1992.
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 18 (c)-(e):
(c) A challenge may be made to the panel or to an individual juror.

D#28/STEFAN-S.BRF

4

(2) A challenge to an individual juror may be either peremptory or for
cause. A challenge to an individual juror may be made only before the jury is
sworn to try the action, except the court may, for good cause, permit it to be made
after the juror is sworn but before any of the evidence is presented. In challenges
for cause the rules relating to challenges to a panel and hearings thereon shall
apply. All challenges for cause shall be taken first by the prosecution and then by
the defense.
(d) A peremptory challenge is an objection to a juror for which no reason
need be given. In capital cases, each side is entitled to 10 peremptory challenges.
In other felony cases each side is entitled to four peremptory challenges. In
misdemeanor cases, each side is entitled to three peremptory challenges. If tliere
is more than one defendant the court may allow the defendants additional
peremptory challenges and permit them to be exercised separately or jointly.
(e) The challenge for cause is an objection to a particular juror and may be
taken on one or more of the following grounds:
(1) want of any of the qualifications prescribed by law;
(2) any mental or physical infirmity which renders one incapable
of performing the duties of a juror;
(3) consanguinity or affinity within the fourth degree to the person
alleged to be injured by the offense charged, or on whose complaint the
prosecution was instituted;
(4) the existence of any social, legal, business, fiduciary or other
relationship between the prospective juror and any party, witness or
person alleged to have been victimized or injured by the defendant, which
relationship when viewed objectively, would suggest to reasonable minds
that the prospective juror would be unable or unwilling to return a verdict
which would be free of favoritism. A prospective juror shall not be
disqualified solely because he is indebted to or employed by the state or
a political subdivision thereof;
(5) having been or being the party adverse to the defendant in a
civil action, or having complained against or having been accused by him
in a criminal prosecution;
(6) having served on the grand jury which found the indictment;
(7) having served on a trial jury which has tried another person for
the particular offense charged;
(8) having been one of a jury formally sworn to try the same
charge, and whose verdict was set aside, or which was discharged without
a verdict after the case was submitted to it;
(9) having served as a juror in a civil action brought against the
defendant for the act charged as an offense;
(10) if the offense charged is punishable with death, the
entertaining of such conscientious opinions about the death penalty as
D#28/STEFAN-S.BRF
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would preclude the juror from voting to impose the death penalty
following conviction regardless of the facts;
(11) because he is or, within one year preceding, has been engaged
or interested in carrying on any business, calling or employment, the
carrying on of which is a violation of law, where defendant is charged with
a like offense;
(12) because he has been a witness, either for or against the
defendant on the preliminary examination or before the grand jury;
(13) having formed or expressed an unqualified opinion or belief
as to whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty of the offense charged;
or
(14) that a state of mind exists on the part of the juror with
reference to the cause, or to either party, which will prevent him from
acting impartially and without prejudice to the substantial rights of the
party challenging; but no person shall be disqualified as a juror by reason
of having formed or expressed an opinion upon the matter or cause to be
submitted to such jury, founded upon public rumor, statements in public
journals or common notoriety, if it satisfactorily appears to the court that
the juror can and will, notwithstanding such opinion, act impartially and
fairly upon the matter to be submitted to him.

VI. STATEMENT OF CASE
1.

Nature of Case. The Defendant appeals his conviction by a jury for Lewdness

Involving a Cliild, a Class A Misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Annotated 76-9-702.5,
1953 As Amended, in the First Judicial District Court, in and for Rich County, State of Utah,
the Honorable Clint S. Judkins presiding.
2.

Statement of Facts. The Appellant was convicted at his retrial after remand from

a prior appeal, State vs. Stefaniak. 900 P.2d 1094 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), by a jury in Rich County,
State of Utah.
The Defendant was charged in an Information, signed by David L. Bennett 1 , witli
committing a crime of Lewdness Involving a Child at Rich County, State of Utah, on or about

1

David L. Bennett is presently a Deputy Sheriff for Cache County.
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July 15, 1992, in violation of Utah Code Annotated, 76-9-702.5. "The acts of the Defendant
constituting the crime were: That tlie said Defendant exposed his genitals or private parts under
circumstances under which he or she knew would likely cause affront or alann to, on, or in tlie
presence of another who is under the age of 14."
In the summer of 1992, tlie Defendant took his four (4) step children to Bear Lake for
an outing. During the day, tlie Defendant and two (2) of the children, Cassandra Carson and
Holly Crill floated some distance out in the lake on two (2) inner tubes. At some point,
Holly Crill returned to shore and the Defendant and Cassandra Carson continued across tlie lake
on the larger of the two (2) inner tubes. The state contends that tlie Defendant committed the
criminal violation charged while on the inner tubes out in tlie lake in tlie presence of
Cassandra Carson and Holly Crill. The state called four (4) witnesses at trial.
Harvey Carson2, tlie father of Cassandra Carson.

Mr. Carson offered no evidence

regarding the commission of the offense charged in the Information [ Trial Transcript, page 7482].
Charlotte Crill3, mother of the four (4) step children and former wife of tlie Defendant.
Ms. Crill offered no evidence regarding the commission of tlie offense. [Trial Transcript, page 8293].
The other two (2) witnesses were Cassandra Carson and Holly Crill. A detailed discussion
of their testimony will take place as part of the argument regarding sufficiency of the evidence.

2

Harvey Carson essentially testified to the age of his daughter and identified certain
pictures of the four (4) step children.
3

The testimony of Ms. Crill was essentially similar to Mr. Carson's, identifying certain
photo exhibits and establishing the age of the four (4) step children.
D#28/STEFAN-S.BRF
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The charges against tlie Defendant were tried to a jury on April 1, 1996. After his Motion
to Continue was denied, tlie Defendant elected not to remain for tlie trial and tlie trial was held
in his absence.

VII. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

The Defendant was denied his right to a trial by an "impartial jury".
a.

The Court improperly denied tlie Defendant's "for cause" challenge of

Juror Dan Ames and failed to adequately probe his potential bias. It is prejudicial
error to compel a party to exercise a peremptory challenge to remove a prospective
juror who should have been removed for cause.
b.

The trial court failed to adequately probe potential bias of jurors

Kimberly Wilson, Lennis Hellstrom, Julie Whatcott, and Perry Norris. Responses
of said jurors established facts in relation to their employment,

family

connections, and other facts which suggested a possible bias in favor of the
prosecution.
c.

Failure of tlie Defendant's counsel to determine tlie nature of tlie Juror,

Dan Ames, prior knowledge of the case and to renew his motion to dismiss Juror
Ames "for cause" was "ineffective assistance of counsel".
2.

The evidence presented at trial was insufficient to establish, to a standard of

"beyond a reasonable doubt", that tlie offense charged took place "on or about July 15, 1992",
and that the offense alleged took place "in Rich County, State of Utah".
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VIII. ARGUMENT
1.

Trial by Impartial luiy. Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution and the

Sixth Amendment to the United States Contitution guarantees the Defendant the right to a trial
by an "impartial jury", State vs. Bishop supra. The trial court's failure to dismiss certain jurors for
cause denied the Defendant his right to trial by an impartial jury. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
Rule 18(e) implements the constitutional mandate and offers guidance as to when a juror should
be removed for cause, State vs. Woollev supra. Rule 18 (e)(14) states;
The challenge for cause is an objection to a particular juror and may be
taken on one or more of the following grounds:
(14) that a state of mind exists on the part of a juror with reference to the cause,
or to either party, which will prevent him from acting impartially and without
prejudice to the substantial rights of the party challenging; but no person shall be
disqualified as a juror by reason of having formed or expressed an opinion upon
the matter or cause to be submitted to such jury, founded upon public rumor,
statements in public journals or common notoriety, if it satisfactorily appears to
the court that the juror can and will, notwithstanding such opinion, act
impartially and fairly upon the matter to be submitted to him.
This Court, in State vs. Woollev supra, has held that "it is prejudicial error to compel a
party to exercise a peremtory challenge to remove a prospective juror who should have been
removed for cause". See also: State vs. Julian supra, State vs. Brooks (Brooks I) supra, State vs.
Brooks (Brooks II) supra.
a.

Failure to Remove luror Dan Ames for Cause. Juror Dan Ames was the

Director of Emergency Management for Rich County and the State Fire Warden
[Trial Transcript, page 29, lines 23-24]. His wife, Debra, was the Rich County
Recorder [Trial Transcript, page 29, lines 24-25]. Juror Ames also acknowledged
having prior knowledge of the case [Trial Transcript, page 3 3 , lines 16-21]. The
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trial court asked Juror Ames a general question regarding his ability to set aside
what he had heard [Trial Transcript, page 33, line 23 - page 34, line 3 ] .

Mr.

Ames answer was "I think so." The trial court did not inquire of Juror Ames what
his knowledge was.

Defense counsel inquired of Juror Ames if he had formed an

opinion. Juror Ames answered "I don't know. Maybe." [Trial Transcript, page
37, lines 20-23]. Defense counsel further questioned Juror Ames whether he had
formed an opinion based on the prior knowledge and received an equivocal answer
a

I don't think so." [Trial Transcript, page 38, line 6]. At that point, defense

counsel requested that the trial court excuse Juror Ames for cause. The trial court
made a further inquiry [Trial Transcript, page 38, line 15-24] and Juror Ames
gave another equivocal answer "I don't think it would affect me." At this point the
trial court denied the motion to excuse Juror Ames for cause [Trial Transcript,
page 39, lines 1-2]. After denial of the motion, defense counsel made further
inquiry and in response to a question Mr. Ames acknowledged that in his job he
worked with the county sheriffs office [Trial Transcript, page 39, lines 21-24].
The trial court in questioning Juror Ames regarding his prior knowledge
failed to determine what the jurors prior knowledge of the case was. In fact the
trial court said, "Mr. Ames, you raised your hand. I don't want you tell me what
you know about the case, but you've heard about this case, is that correct?" [Trial
Transcript, page 33, lines 19-21].

In this case the Defendant had been

previously convicted by a jury in Rich County and the conviction had been
reversed by this Court, State vs. Stefaniak supra. It is hard to believe that if Juror
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Ames had knowledge of the prior conviction, it would not be pre judical to the
Defendant Failure to determine what Juror Ames prior knowledge was clearly left
the possibility that he had prior knowledge of the previous conviction.
Although the decision to dismiss a prospective juror for cause is within the
sound discretion of the trial court, considering Dan Ames close relationship to
Rich County through employment, his spouse, and the fact he worked so closely
with the sheriffs office, and the fact that his responses to all of the questions
regarding his possible bias were equivocal; the trial court should have removed
him for cause, State vs. Woollev supra, State vs. Parrish supra, State vs. Gotschall
supra. The fact that he may have already formed an opinion and the fact that
there was a total failure to determine what his prior knowledge was, even though
that prior knowledge may have been critical, if his prior knowledge was that there
had been a prior conviction which had been reversed, all add up to an abuse of
discretion by the trial court. As stated in State vs. Woollev supra:
Accordingly, trial courts must adequately
probe a jurorfs potential bias when that juror's
responses or other facts suggest a bias. The court's
discretion is properly exercised when deciding
whether to dismiss a juror for cause only after this
investigation takes place.
State vs. Woollev supra, further states, "It is prejudicial error to compel a party to
exercise a peremptory challenge to remove a prospective juror who should have
been removed for cause." and compels reversal as a result of the trial court's
failure to remove Dan Ames from the jury panel for cause. See also: State vs.
Gotschall.
D#28/STEFAN-S.BRF

1 1

b.

Failure to Ensure an Impartial Tury Panel. The Supreme Court of tiie

State of Utah has emphasized that "it is [the trial judge's] duty to see that the
constitutional right of an accused to an impartial jury is safeguarded", State vs.
Woollev supra, State vs. Dixon supra. And imposed upon die trial court the duty
to "probe a juror's potential bias when that juror's responses or otlier facts suggest
a bias. The court's discretion is properly exercised when deciding whetlier to
dismiss a juror for cause only after this investigation takes place.", State vs. Woollcv
supra, State vs. Cobb supra.
Facts surrounding several of the jurors on the jury panel presented a
question of possible bias in favor of the prosecution. Jurors which should have
been probed by the court in further detail are:
Juror Kimberly Wilson worked for the Rich County Assessor's Office
[Trial Transcript, page 29, line 17-18]. Mrs. Wilson also acknowledged that she,
as part of her work for the Assessor's Office, worked around most of the Sheriffs
Office personnel, Mr. Preston, and the court staff on a daily basis. Her response
to the defense counsel's question to whetlier she may have a tendency to support
the state's case was equivocal "I don't think so. No." [Trial Transcript, page 40,
lines 8-18].
Juror Lennis Hellstrom's sister-in-law worked as a secretary with the
sheriffs office [Trial Transcript, page 39, lines 12-13].
Juror Julie Whatcott was the niece of the court and county clerk,
Becky Peart. [Trial Transcript, page 41, lines 9-10].

D#28/STEFAN-S.BRF
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Juror Peny Norris acknowledged that in connection with his duties as a
bishop "I had — IVe been involved -- I served as a bishop and I was involved in a
couple of different cases with youth that exposed me to situations like this." [Trial
I

Transcript, page 56, lines 10-13]; and further, that one of those situations was a
family member [Trial Transcript, page 56, line 21].
c.

Failure to Determine

Juror Ames Prior Knowledge and Renew

Objection. In the event that this Court determines that failure of Defendant's
I
counsel to determine the nature of Juror Ames prior knowledge of the case and/or
to renew his motion to dimiss Juror Ames for cause was a waiver, or that the
Defendant may not challenge the trial court's failure to remove said juror for cause
at this stage of the proceedings, then defense counsel's failures were ineffective
assistance of counsel. In order to establish that the Defendant has been denied
!
his Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel, the Defendant must meet a
two (2) part test. State vs. Templin supra stated,
First, the defendant must show that counsel's
performance was deficient. This requires showing
that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was
not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the
defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the
defendant must show that the deficient performance
prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that
counsel's error were so serious as to deprive the
defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is
reliable.
See also: State vs. Johnson supra, State vs. Vigil supra.
It is the Defendant's position, as pointed out above, that failure to dismiss
i
i

Juror Ames for cause resulted in denial of the Defendant's constitutional right to
13

a trial before an impartial jury. Denial of a constitutional right so fundamental
as the right to a trial before an impartial jury is in and of itself prejudicial to the
Defendant.

If defense counsel's actions resulted in the denial of such a

fundamental constitutional right it is clearly ineffective assistance of counsel. 4
2.

Evidence Insufficient to Support Conviction. The standard of review which

this Court must apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence on which the Defendant was
convicted was stated by the Utah Supreme Court in State vs. Petree supra as follows:
. . . we review the evidence and all inferences which may reasonably be drawn
from it in the light most favorable to the verdict of the jury. W e reverse a jury
conviction for insufficient evidence only when the evidence, so viewed, is
sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must
have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of
which he was convicted.
See also: State vs. Singer supra, State vs. Vigil supra, State vs. Newbold supra, State vs. Walker supia.
In this case two (2) elements of the offense were not supported by sufficient evidence «o
establish the Defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; 1) that the offense occurred on < >r
about July 15, 1992, and 2) that the offense occurred in Rich County, State of Utah.
a.

Date of Offense. The only evidence to establish that date of the offence

was the testimony of Cassandra Carson [Trial Transcript, page 95, lines 3-8] as
follows:
Q. Do you recall an incident in about July of 1992 in which you
came to Bear Lake with Steve?

A. Yes.

4

It is the Defendant's position that the trial court had an obligation to further question
Juror Ames and to dismiss Juror Ames for cause without any further action on the part of
defense counsel. Therefor, denial of the Defendant's right to trial by an impartial jury was
the fault of the trial court.
D#28/STEFAN-S.BRF
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Q. And can you fix a date on that?
A. It was - - I don't exactly remember the date, but I remember it
was in the summer, around July.
The only fair conclusion to be drawn from that testimony is that the
witness did not remember the date, but only remembered that it was during tlie
summer. The incident could have been in June, July or August or perhaps later.
The Defendant was charged with having committed tlie offense "on or
about July 15, 1992 w [See Information].

The jury was instructed that die

Defendant was charged with having committed tlie offense "on or about July 15,
1992" [Trial Transcript, page 139, line 11 - page 140, line 7]. The jury was
instructed in instruction no. 2 that;
Before you find tlie defendant guilty of tlie crime of
lewdness involving a child you must find from tlie evidence,
beyond a reasonable doubt, all of tlie following elements of that
crime.... And number three, that the said act of the defendant occurred
on or about July 15 of 1992 (emphasis added).
[Trial Transcript, page 140, lines 8-12 and 18-20].
The Defendant was not charged with having committed tlie offense during
the summer of 1992 or during June, July, or August of 1992 5 . The jury was not
free to disregard the specific date and convict so long as tlie offense only occurred
during tlie summer or perhaps June, July, or August of 1992. The jury disregarded
this element.

I 5 The State could have elected to charge tlie offense as having been committed during
the summer and/or in June, July, or August, but elected not to do so. Instead, the State
elected to establish a specific date upon which tlie defendant was entitled to rely.
D#28/STEFAN-S.BRF
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b.

Location of Offense. The only reliable evidence regarding the location

of the acts constituting the offense, is that they occurred at Bear Lake. It is
common knowledge that Bear Lake is partially in the State of Utah and partially
in the State of Idaho. That portion of the lake located in the State of Utah is
located in Rich County. There was no evidence presented at trial establisliing the
location on the lake where the acts constiuting the offense took place. Further,
there is no evidence establisliing the boundary line between Utah and Idaho.
Apparently, the prosecution's questions regarding whether the Defendant
turned right or left when he arrived at Bear Lake were intended to establish
whether he was in Utah or Idaho. The record contains no evidence to establish
the location of the Utah-Idaho boundary. The evidence is insufficient to establish
beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant turned right or if he did turn right,
that he went a sufficient distance south to ensure that he was in Utah.
The evidence presented regarding the direction of travel when the
Defendant and the children arrived at Bear Lake was through the testimony of
Cassandra Carson and Holly Crill.
Cassandra testified as follows:
Q. Okay. Do you remember coming to an intersection, coming
down a canyon, to an intersection?
A. I remember seeing a yogurt stand, a raspberry yogurt stand; and
a tombstone with some wood carved in it.
Q. Okay. And then from that place where did you go? Did you
go to a public beach?
A. Where we swam at, yeah.
Q. Okay. Do you remember whether you turned right or left at
that intersection?
A. I'm not sure, but I think we might have turned right.
D#28/STEFAN-S.BRF
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Q. And how far did you go after you turned right, how far did you
go south?
A. We went all the way around the tliingy until we were going to
where we were going.
Q. To a public beach?
A. There wasn't any people around.
[Trial Transcript, page 95, line 22 - page 96, line 15]
The only fair inference from that testimony is that the witness did not
recall whether they turned right or left and that they may have turned right. The
inference must be drawn that they also may have turned left. The prosecutor's
statement [Trial Transcript, page 96, line 10-11] was a misstatement of the
evidence and clearly intended to lead the witness into establishing the direction
of travel. The witness did not take the lead.
The

direction

of

travel

was

later

discussed

with

the

witness

Cassandra Carson as follows:
A. Wait. Yeah, we filled them up at the service station by the
yogurt station.
Q. Okay.
A. They were filled up when we got to the beach.
Q. So you filled up the inner tubes and then you turned right at
the service station and went to a beach, is that correct?
A. I'm sure, but I'm not sure about the right, but the way I
remember tilings I'm pretty sure it was right, but I'm not all the
way sure.
[Trial Transcript, page 97, line 19 - page 98, line 3]
Even though the proscutor attempted to lead the child witness, she clearly
did not remember the direction of travel and stated so.

D#28/STEFAN-S.BRF

17

The only other testimony regarding the direction of travel was offered by
Holly Crill as follows:
Q. And where did you go?
A. Bear Lake.
Q. Do you remember a Texaco service station as you came into the
Bear Lake area, or a service station?
A. A service station.
Q. And what did you do at the service station?
A. I can't remember.
Q. Do you remember putting any air in the inner tubes?
A. I think that's — in the big inner tube, I think. (Inaudible.)
Q. When you got to the service station which way did you turn,
right or left?
A. I think it was right.
Q. I think he's trying to tell you to speak up a little louder, maybe.
And so then where did you go after you turned at the service
station?
A. To Bear Lake.
Q. And who went down to the lake? How many of you went to the
lake?
A. There was me, Steve, Headier, Cassie and Shawn.
[Trial Transcript, page 121, line 13 - page 122, line 11]
This witness' testimony regarding the direction of travel is equivocal. The
only fair inference from the testimony is that Holly Crill had no clear recollection
of the direction of travel, but she thinks it was right.
Considering the evidence, not the prosecutor's statements, the direction
of travel after reacliing Bear Lake was not established beyond a reasonable doubt.
W h e t h e r the acts constituting the offense took place in the State of Utah or the
State of Idaho is not supported by evidence in the record.
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The jury was instructed in instruction no. 1 that the acts constituting the
offense took place in Rich County, State of Utah, and the jury was further
instructed in instruction no. 2 that;
Before you find the defendant guilty of the crime of
lewdness involving a child you must find from the evidence,
beyond a reasonable doubt, all of the following elements of that
crime. . . . And number three, that the said act of the defendant did
occur in Rich County, State of Utah, (emphasis added).
[Trial Transcript, page 140, lines 8-12 and 17-18],
The jury apparently either disregarded that instruction or relied upon
evidence or information not presented at trial.
IX. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, this Court should find that the Defendant did not receive a trial by an
impartial jury. That the trial court improperly failed to dismiss Juror Dan Ames for cause and
failed to adequately probe potential bias of various jury members to ensure that the Defendant
would receive a trial by an impartial jury.
Second, that defense counsel's failure to determine the nature of Juror Dan Ames prior
knowledge of the case and to renew the motion to dismiss Juror Ames for cause was ineffective
assistance of counsel.
Third, that the evidence did not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the acts
constituting the offense took place on or about July 15, 1992, and/or that it occurred in Rich
County, State of Utah.
WHEREFORE, the Defendant requests this Court reverse his conviction and dismiss the
case against him.
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Respectfully submitted this 8th day of May, 1997.
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